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What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"? 
STEPHEN B. BURBANK• 
In this article, the author argues that the concept of "judicial independence" has 
served more as an object of rhetoric than it has of sustained study. He views the 
scholarly literatures that treat it as ships passing in the night, each subject to 
weaknesses that reflect the needs and fashions of the discipline, but all tending to 
ignore courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Seeking both 
greater rigor and greater flexibility than one usually finds in public policy debates 
about, and in the legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence, 
the author attributes much of the difficulty to three fundamental shortcomings, the 
failure to recognize that (1) judicial independence is not an end of government but 
a means to an end (or ends), (2) judicial independence and judicial accountability 
are not discrete concepts at war with one another, but rather complementary 
concepts that can and should be regarded as allies, and (3) judicial independence is 
not a monolith. 
The author shows how the instrnmental approach key to recognizing the first 
shortcoming also helps to grasp the second and third, and he explores the 
implications of each for the additional research that judicial independence needs 
and deserves. That research, he argues, should no longer ignore state courts or 
lower federal courts, and neither should it ignore changes in attitudes towards, or 
in the practical circumstances of, contemporary law and lawmaking. Recognizing 
that attention to the different functions that courts perform, even within the same 
system, may lead one to consider whether they should be subject to different 
arrangements concerningjudicial independence (and accountability), the author 
suggests a number of inquiries that might profitably inform the answers to such 
questions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order usefully to discuss why we value or should value judicial independence, 
it is necessary to answer the anterior question of what we mean by judicial 
Copyright ~ 2002 by Stephen B. Burbank. 
• David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, UniversityofPennsylvania. This 
article is a revised version of part of a chapter that I co-authored with Barry Friedman. See Stephen 
B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
AT 1lffi CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPUNARY APPROACH 9--42 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry 
Friedman eds. 2002). Although I was primarily responsible for the part revised and presented here, 
the chapter and the larger enterprise of which it is a part were very much a partnership, and I 
appreciate Professor Friedman's permission to publish this aspect of our work separately. I am also 
indebted to the many scholars who participated in the conference sponsored by the American 
Judicature Society("AJS") and the Brennan Center for Justiceoutofwhich our book emerged, see 
id. at 4, as well as to the organizers of and participants in Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 
the conference at which this article was presented. 
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independence. The answer to that question, I believe, is, in the words of William 
Jefferson Clinton, "it depends." 
Judicial independence exists primarily as a rhetorical notion rather than as a 
subject of sustained, organized study. Many scholars assume that a judiciary with at 
least some independence is important to the protection of property rights and 
individual liberty, if not to the maintenance of democratic governance itself. But legal 
writing on the subject all too often seems part of a polemical debate between 
contending camps. Very little of this work even acknowledges the existence of state 
courts, let alone considers how the variety of arrangements governing state judiciaries 
might affect general theories of judicial independence. Meanwhile, the political 
science literature has not been immune to its own brand of extremism, much work 
failing to acknowledge that different courts may play different roles and, more 
generally, viewing the question of judicial independence in all or nothing terms. 
There is good, serious work about judicial independence in both the legal and 
political science literatures, but there is too little of it, and too often the products have 
been like ships passing in the night.1 
My goal is to achieve a degree of rigor on the one hand, and of flexibility on the 
other hand, that is missing from most public policy debates about, and much of the 
legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence. Many people simply 
assume that there is agreement about what judicial independence is, thereby relieving 
them of the duty to state precisely what they mean when invoking the term. Many 
others are quite clear what they mean by judicial independence, but their definitions 
are so obviously the product of the academy (or of self-interest) that they are ill-suited 
for the practical business of government. Still others capitalize on the multiplicity of 
possible meanings of judicial independence, with the same result. 
These barriers to understanding and hence to progress tend to reflect, and to some 
extent may be due to, three fundamental shortcomings. The first is the failure to 
recognize and/or faithfully to incorporate in analysis the fact that, when the mists of 
rhetoric have parted, in no modern political society of which I am aware is judicial 
independence itself a goal of government. Those responsible for the formal structures 
of government, and for the informal norms that fill up their interstices, do not seek 
whatever degree of independence they favor for the judiciary because they believe 
that judicial independence is itself normatively desirable. Rather, judicial 
independence is a means to an end (or, more probably, to more than one end).2 
The second and third shortcomings are related to, at least in the sense that they 
may be encouraged by, the first. Thus, and second, discussions of judicial 
1 ''There is no literature on judicial independence; rather, there are 'literatures'." Stephen B. 
Burbank et al., Introduction, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT 1HE CROSSROADS: AN 
INTERDISClPLINARY APPROACH 3 (Stephen B. Burbank & Bany Friedman eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT 1HE CROSSROADS]. 
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independence often proceed on the erroneous premise, stated or unstated, that judicial 
independence and judicial accountability are discrete concepts at war with each other, 
when in fact they are complementary concepts that can and should be regarded as 
allies. This supposed dichotomy between independence and accountability is a 
favorite target oflegal scholars in search of a paradox; when it is found to be present, 
many political scientists regard it as proof that judicial independence is a myth (or a 
hypothesis not confirmed). The instrumental view of judicial independence taken 
here, on the other hand, requires no dichotomy and sees no paradox, since it proceeds 
from the premise that judicial independence and judicial accountability "are different 
sides of the same coin. "3 An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak 
and feeble. An independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous.4 
The third shortcoming of many discussions of judicial independence is the 
erroneous assumption that judicial independence is a monolith. According to this 
view, judicial independence has the same value, even if instrumental value, no matter 
what the court. Most legal scholars who write about judicial independence know 
nothing and care less about state courts. 5 Their incentive structures or utility functions 
reflect the prominence and prestige of the federal courts in general, and of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in particular.6 To their great credit, political 
scientists have not similarly dispensed with those courts that conduct the great 
majority of judicial business in this country. At the same time, however, much of the 
high profile political science work on judicial independence has similarly 
concentrated on the Supreme Court, attention that may be due to some of the same 
incentives operating in the legal academy but that surely also reflects the current 
perceived need for practitioners of the science to quantifY and measure, and their need 
for data with which to do so.? 
Whatever the reasons for the failure of most scholars of the subject to consider, 
let alone study, state courts and federal trial and intermediate appellate courts, the 
3 /d. at 339 (emphasis added); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present ofJudicial 
Independence, 80 ]UDICATIJRE 117, 117-18 (1996). 
4 See 1iiE CoNSIITUTION OF PHIWPS ACADEMY, ANDOVER MAssACHUSETIS ll-12 (rev. ed. 
1995) (on file with the author): 
But, above all, it is expected, that the Master's attention to the disposition of the Minds and 
Morals of the Youth, under his charge, will exceed every other care; well considering that, 
though goodness without knowledge (as it respect others) is weak and feeble; yet knowledge 
without goodness is dangerous; and that both united fonn the noblest character, and lay the 
surest foundation of usefulness to mankind. 
5 For a recent notable exception, see Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and 
Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, 
at79. 
6 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 81-144 (1995). 
7 See Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative Study of the 
Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYs. J. 243,243-46 (2001). 
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insight that judicial independence is a means to an end (or ends) and not an end in 
itself suggests that the quantum and quality of independence (and accountability) 
enjoyed by different courts in different systems, and indeed by different courts within 
the same system, may not be, and perhaps should not be, the same. To that extent 
judicial independence is not a monolith. Indeed, it could be otherwise only if the 
architects of, and the major players in, the governments of all American polities had 
the same attitudes towards and aspirations for their judiciaries, and for evezy court 
within their judicial system. Both history and a comparison of the ammgements that 
different states have made and now make for their courts tell us that this cannot be so. 
The point is also clear when one tries to imagine a general theory of judicial 
independence and takes account of experience in different (foreign) legal systems, as 
it does when one tries to conceive a general theory of independence as a tool of 
modern government. 
ll. JUDICIAL iNDEPENDENCE Is A MEANS TO AN END (OR ENDS) 
No rational politician, and probably no sensible person, would want courts to 
enjoy complete decisional independence, by which I mean freedom to decide a case 
as the court sees fit without any constraint, exogenous or endogenous, actual or 
prospective. 8 Courts are institutions run by human beings. Human beings are subject 
to selfish and/or venal motives, and even moral paragons differ in the quality of their 
mental faculties and in their capacity for judgment and wisdom. In a society that did 
not invest judges with divine guidance (or its equivalent), the decision would not be 
made to submit disputes for resolution to courts that were wholly unaccountable for 
their decisions. One implication of this proposition is that, from a pre-modern, 
anthropological perspective, we need law to constrain judges rather than judges to 
serve the rule oflaw. 9 
As the reference to the rule oflawmay suggest, completely independent courts in 
this sense would also be intolerable because they would render impossible the orderly 
conduct of the social and economic affairs of a society. Citizens would not and could 
not long tum to courts for the resolution of their disputes if the result of each case 
were an immaculate conception, worthless for the governance of future conduct and, 
to citizens unguided by authoritative nonns, apparently in conflict with the decision in 
another case involving similar facts and similar equities. In such a world, an 
opportunity to appeal to a higher court would represent insult added to injury, which 
helps to explain why, even in systems where first instance courts are in theory not 
8 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Impossibility of Judicial Independence (undated) 
(unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center Conference, see supra note *) (on file 
with the author). 
9 See Oscar G. Chase, A Speculation on Judicial Independence, Triadic Disputing, and 
Cultural Legitimacy (January 31, 2001) (unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center 
Conference, see supra note *) (on file with the author). 
326 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol 64:323 
insight that judicial independence is a means to an end (or ends) and not an end in 
itself suggests that the quantum and quality of independence (and accountability) 
enjoyed by different courts in different systems, and indeed by different courts within 
the same system, may not be, and perhaps should not be, the same. To that extent 
judicial independence is not a monolith. Indeed, it could be otherwise only if the 
architects of, and the major players in, the governments of all American polities had 
the same attitudes towards and aspirations for their judiciaries, and for every court 
within their judicial system. Both history and a comparison of the arrangements that 
different states have made and now make for their courts tell us that this cannot be so. 
The point is also clear when one tries to imagine a general theory of judicial 
independence and takes account of experience in different (foreign) legal systems, as 
it does when one tries to conceive a general theory of independence as a tool of 
modem government. 
ll. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE Is A MEANS TO AN END (OR ENDS) 
No rational politician, and probably no sensible person, would want courts to 
enjoy complete decisional independence, by which I mean freedom to decide a case 
as the court sees fit without any constraint, exogenous or endogenous, actual or 
prospective. 8 Courts are institutions run by human beings. Human beings are subject 
to selfish and/or venal motives, and even moral paragons differ in the quality of their 
mental faculties and in their capacity for judgment and wisdom In a society that did 
not invest judges with divine guidance (or its equivalent), the decision would not be 
made to submit disputes for resolution to courts that were wholly unaccountable for 
their decisions. One implication of this proposition is that, from a pre-modem, 
anthropological perspective, we need law to constrain judges rather than judges to 
serve the rule oflaw.9 
As the reference to the rule of law may suggest, completely independent courts in 
this sense would also be intolerable because they would render impossible the orderly 
conduct of the social and economic affairs of a society. Citizens would not and could 
not long turn to courts for the resolution of their disputes if the result of each case 
were an immaculate conception, worthless for the governance of future conduct and, 
to citizens unguided by authoritative norms, apparently in conflict with the decision in 
another case involving similar facts and similar equities. In such a world, an 
opportunity to appeal to a higher court would represent insult added to injury, which 
helps to explain why, even in systems where first instance courts are in theory not 
8 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Impossibility of Judicial Independence (undated) 
(unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center Conference, see supra note •) (on tile 
with the author). 
9 See Oscar G. Chase, A Speculation on Judicial Independence, Triadic Disputing, and 
Cultural Legitimacy (January 31, 2001 )(unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center 
Conference, see supra note*) (on tile with the author). 
2003] WHAT DO WE MEAN? 327 
constnrined by precedent, such as Italy, they do not lightly depart from the law as 
previously articulated by a higher court. I o 
Thus, once a political society accepts the importance oflaw for the prospective 
governance of human affairs, courts cannot be accorded complete decisional 
independence. In societies that divide responsibility for making such law among 
different institutions, similar considerations require the creation of a hierarchy of 
authority providing decision rules for the resolution of conflict between or among 
those institutions. Unless such rules always privilege the views of the society's courts, 
complete decisional independence is for that reason also impossible. II 
In fact, most developed political societies privilege law made by legislatures. In 
such societies courts have the obligation to interpret and apply (subject to constnrints 
found in a written or unwritten constitution) legislative law, with which obligation 
complete decisional independence is obviously and fatally inconsistent. 12 
No American federal or state court of which I am aware has ever enjoyed 
complete decisional independence, and if that is what judicial independence is taken 
to mean, as a historical matter it is, indeed, a myth.I3 Moreover, and more important 
for present purposes, consideration of just the formal arrangements governing 
American courts reveals that the aspirations of those responsible for their creation and 
continued operation could not have included complete decisional independence. 
Consider the federal courts, not because of their prominence or prestige, but 
because they appear to enjoy the greatest measure of judicial independence of any 
American courts.I4 The Constitution confers on Congress the power to impeach and 
I 0 See MAURO CAPPEUETI1 ET AL., THE IT AllAN LEGAl. SYSTEM: ANlNTRODUCilON246-47, 
252-53,270-73 (1967); Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial Independence in Latin Countries of Western 
Europe, in JUDIOAL INDEPENDENCE IN 1liE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRmCAL PERsPECI1VES FROM 
AROUND TilE WORLD 111, 112-13 (Peter H. Russell & DavidM. O'Brien eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 1liE AGE OF DEMOCRACY]. There are likely other reasons having to do 
with the incentive structure in a career judiciary. See, e.g., Guarnieri, supra, at 113; J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Skewed Incentives: Paying for Politics as a Japanese Judge, 83 
JUDICA'IURE 190(2000). 
II Taking Professor Rubin's perspective, complete decisional independence is revealed as 
intolerable for any institution of government where power is shared. See Edward L. Rubin, 
Independence as a Governance Mechanism, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, 
supra note 1, at 56-100. Moreover, attention to the allocation of government power suggests that, 
even if complete decisional independence for courts were tolerable, unless a society were also 
willing to give courts the means to enforce their decisions, it would be futile. 
12 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Judicial Independence: A Structure for Analysis (December 
21, 2000) (unpublished paper prepared for the AJS/Brennan Center Conference, see supra note •) 
(on file with the author). 
I3 See Herbert Jacob, The Courts as Political Agencies: An Historical Analysis, 8 T'uL. Sruo. 
PoL SCI. 9, 48, 50 (1962); Burbank, supra note 2, at 326. 
I4 The fact that decisions interpreting federal statutes can be effectively overruled by the 
enactment of subsequent legislation might be deemed relevant to the subject of judicial 
independence. Although one can certainly imagine a court avoiding a particular decision because 
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remove Article ill judges from office. IS It is true that a very strong norm has 
developed against using this power in reaction to the content of judicial decisions 
(and hence to coerce different decisions in the futme). We should remember, 
however, that the result in the early 1800s impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase, 
which is regarded as generative of the norm, was very close.16 
The Constitution also confers on Congress the power to determine which if any 
lower federal courts will exist and, as interpreted, which if any of the cases and 
controversies enumerated in Article ill they will be enabled to hear, and even the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to exceptions and regulations 
Congress may prescribe.17 Although the triumph of judicial review and judicial 
supremacy in the nineteenth century may have helped to persuade Congress that it 
would be unconstitutional to strip the judges of the Connnerce Court of their offices 
when it abolished that court early in the twentieth century, it did abolish the court and 
could take similar action in the future. IS 
Congress' formal powers to control or influence the decisions of the federal 
courts are not confined to the impeachment process, court-stripping, and the 
regulation of original and appellate jurisdiction. For Congress also decides how many 
judges will sit on a given federal court. Some scholars conclude that it has added 
justices to the Supreme Court directly to affect decisions on matters of great 
importance to it. 19 Again, the fact that the failure of Roosevelt's 193 7 court -packing 
of concern that, in light of a high likelihood of override, the decision would be an embarrassment 
or a futility, the phenomenon seems best considered as part of the allocation oflawmaking power. 
See THE FEDERAliST No. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A 
legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a 
particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases.''). 
15 See U.S. CONST. art. IT,§ 4. 
!6 See WILUAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE 
SAMUEL CHAsE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 74--105, 125 (1992); l...4.WRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, 
A HisToRY OF AMERlCAN LAW 132 (2d ed. 1985); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROwrn OF 
AMERICAN LAw: THE LAWMAKERS 136-37 (1950). 
17 The text is literally accurate, see U.S. CoNST. art. Ill,§§ 1, 2; Palmorev. UnitedStates,411 
U.S. 389,400-01 (1973), but here as elsewhere where congressional action requires legislation, the 
executive is involved. 
18 See WD.J..IAM S. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES wrrn EsPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE TENURE OF FEDERAL JUDGES 78-1 00 (1918); Bany Friedman, The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Dijficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 333, 431-32 (I 998). Congress has also, albeit infrequently and not in modem times, sought 
to exercise decisional control over the Supreme Court by regulating its calendar and appellate 
jurisdiction. See CARPENTER, supra, at 76-77; REHNQUIST, supra note 16, at 132; David P. Currie, 
The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, /801-1805,33 WAKEFORESrL. 
REv. 219,233 (1998). 
19 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 378-79; G. Edward White, Salmon Portland Chase and 
the Judicial Culture of the Supreme Court in the Civil War Era, in 'filE SUPREME COURT AND TI-lE 
CIVIL WAR 37-39, 43 (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1996). But see Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary 
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plan has generated (or confirmed) a strong norm against the use of the formal power 
does not negate its existence or (entirely) eliminate the shadow it may cast.2° 
All of this would probably suffice to persuade one new to the study of our 
institutional arrangements that the federal judiciary is the weakest and hence "least 
dangerous" branch.21 Yet, I have not even considered that which prompted Hamilton 
so to describe it in The Federalist No. 78, namely that Congress wields the power of 
the purse (controlling the budget of the federal courts), while the Executive wields the 
power of the sword (being responsible for the enforcement of judicial decisions). Nor, 
of course, have I considered state court systems, in most of which the judges of at 
least some courts must stand for some form of election and serve for terms far shorter 
than life.22 
These formal exogenous constraints are potent evidence against any assertion, 
explicit or irtlplicit, that the "judicial independence" we use as a label to describe the 
result of the arrangements made for the federal judiciary means, or could possibly 
have been intended to mean, complete decisional independence. It is also likely that 
the architects of those arrangements envisioned and thus took into account 
endogenous constraints on decisional independence. Law itself may have been 
thought to function as such a constraint, at least to the extent that it was (sincerely) 
believed to be determinate and discoverable (as opposed to indeterminate and 
judicially created). 23 The existence in the Constitution ofboth the Supreme Court and 
the Supremacy Clause suggests others, to wit, a hierarchy of authority and at least the 
beginnings of institutional hierarchy.24 
For these purposes it is not necessary to agree about-and I do not here seek to 
identifY-the goals that the architects of the federal (or any other) court system 
actually did seek to achieve in providing the measure of judicial independence they 
lndepentlence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 1, at 176 {"Either 
court packing was not their dominant motivation or they recognized that their plans to court pack 
ran counter to established norms against such a practice and so needed to be obscured."). 
20 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 322-23. More subtly, Congress can use the power not to add 
judges to overburdened lower courts as a means to discipline those courts for unpopular decisions 
or simply to keep them busy and out of trouble. Similar motivation probably helps to explain the 
refusal of early Congresses to heed the pleas of the Justices of the Supreme Court that they be 
relieved of the onerous business of riding circuit. See Jacob, supra note 13, at 21-27. 
21 THE FEDERAUSTNO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961 ). 
22 See Am. Judicature Soc'y, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General 
Jurisdiction Courts, at http://www.ajs.org!Judicial%20Selection%20Charts3.pdf {last updated 
December 2000). 
23 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 330, 336. 
24 See U.S. CONST. art. ill, § I; id. art. VI. Recent scholarship on the history of the struggles 
for judicial review and judicial supremacy, however, cautions us about inferences in that regard 
from the time of the founding. See Friedman, supra note 18. A recent decision exploring the 
history of precedent in this country is another reminder not to retroject modem views to that period. 
See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d ll55 {9thCir. 2001). 
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did, or that the architects of the future should seek to achieve. Professor Rubin's 
general approach, reflecting the modem administrative state, causes him to dismiss 
the contemporary relevance of separation of powers and to highlight the due process 
values served by decisional independence.25 Professor Scheppele's awareness that 
due process, however important, may yield nothing more than arid fonnalismand her 
concern with constitutional courts in developing democracies cause her to highlight 
judicial review. 26 The framers of the United States Constitution appear to have sought 
to achieve both goals in making the arrangements they did for the federaljudiciary.27 
The United States is not the same country it was in 1787, and although our 
Constitution has changed very little in the intervening years, the same cannot be said 
about our notions oflaw and lawmaking. Moreover, as we have seen, the Constitution 
would provide very little protection against an executive and legislature intent on 
controlling the decisional independence of the federal courts. Finally, change rather 
than permanence has been the norm in the architecture of the arrangements that 
formally determine state court independence. 28 This suggests that, as the ends to be 
achieved change, so (subject to federal or state constitutions) may the means. 
ill. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY ARE 
D1FFERENT SIDES OF TilE SAME COIN 
In previous work positing as the central goal of the architects of federal judicial 
independence the enablement of judicial review, I explored the implications of the 
fact that the legal arrangements whose consequences are described by the terms 
"judicial independence" and "judicial accountability'' are separately situated in the 
Constitution. 
If this were all, one might plausibly maintain that, because the legal arrangements 
whose consequences they descnbe are separately situated in the Constitution, 
judicial independence and judicial accountability are analytically discrete concepts, 
at least as they concern the federal judiciary. Even on those tenns, however, the 
argument would be difficult to maintain. That is because, as a concept that descnbes 
the consequences oflegal arrangements, judicial independence invites attention to 
that which it denies, a process that quickly directs attention to the importance of 
context and purpose. 
Once one has fonnulated the concept of judicial independence in light of its 
purposes, it becomes clear that, at the federal level, "the article respecting 
25 See Rubin, supra note ll. 
26 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Declaratrons of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political 
Pressure, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note l, at 227-79. 
27 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 318-26, 335-39. 
28 See Lee Epstein et al., Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE 
CROSSROADS, supra note l, at 191-226. 
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impeachments" is not the "only provision" that confers power, the exercise of which 
would deny the power of federal cowts to make decisions free of executive or 
legislative control. Indeed, the impeachment article has become a virtual dead letter 
for that purpose, but, as we have seen, the political branches are hardly without 
alternative weapons. 
To some extent, confusion on this matter may arise from the restricted meaning of 
'~udicial accountability" that follows from consideration of the limits history has 
imposed on the federal impeaclunent power. But again, as a purposive legal 
concept, judicial independence is not so restricted, and in thinking about the level of 
executive or legislative control or influence that is compattble with a desired level of 
independence, we are thinking about accountability. The same is true in states with 
elective systems, where the inquiry also includes the level of popular control or 
influence.29 
331 
The temptation to place judicial independence and judicial accountability in 
opposition may be difficult to resist if one views the problem of independence for 
judges as a unique phenomenon. The truth is that, to the contrary, independence is a 
tool used by those responsible for the structure and operation of many government 
institutions. 30 This perspective instantiates, and thus highlights the importance of, an 
instrumental approach to the concept of independence. Moreover, to the extent that 
we are not hostage to history and that constitutions pemrit, viewing the judiciary as 
one part of a complex governmental apparatus holds more promise of yielding a 
realistic conception of what it is we seek from courts today, and the balance between 
independence and accountability that we must afford them in order to get it, than an 
account that is stuck in 1787 and/or that disembodies (usually through apotheosis) 
courts and their independence. 
Both the realization that judicial independence and judicial accountability are 
different sides of the same coin and the knowledge that achieving the proper balance 
between them is not a challenge unique to the judiciary should assist in identifying 
and understanding the complex set of informal nonns and understandings that may 
have more practical importance to judicial independence (and accountability) than 
any formal rules.3 1 Insisting on the traditional dichotomy or on the uniqueness of the 
judiciary, to the contrary, obscures the processes of interaction and dialogue that we 
29 Burbank, supra note 2, at 340. 
30 See Rubin, supra note 11. Once one recognizes that, from an instrumental perspective, 
judicial independence is not unique, the possibility emerges both that theoretical work on 
independence confined to the judiciary is incompletely specified and that, as William Ross has 
observed, historical inquiry so cabined may miss trends that tend to affect the independence of 
other institutions of government as well. See William G. Ross, Suggestions for Future Research on 
Judicial Independence 2 (undated) (unpublished paper prepared for AJS!Brennan Center 
Conference, see supra note •) (on file with the author). 
31 See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 19. 
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know characterize institutional relationships in other systems, both ancient32 and very 
new,33 and that I believe also characterize such relationships in this country. 
Finally, viewing judicial independence and accountability as the joint product of 
purposive legal and political arrangements helps one to understand the weaknesses of 
another traditional dichotomy encountered in the literature: that between the 
independence of an individual judge and the independence of the court and/or judicial 
system of which that judge is a member: 
The capacity of the judiciary, federal and state, to fimction independently of control 
by the executive and legislative branches ... requires the capacity of individual 
judges to enjoy [a measure of] extrainstitutional independence. It also requires that 
the judiciary, as a system of courts, fimction and be perceived to fimction according 
to law. This in turn requires that individual judges yield some intrainstitutional 
independence. 34 
N. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE Is NOT A MONOUTH 
(UNLESS 1HE ENDS ARE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE 1HE SAME) 
I have suggested that the utility function of academics helps to explain the 
preoccupation of scholars, particularly legal scholars, with federal courts in general 
and the Supreme Court in particular.35 Normative scholarship gravitates towards 
institutions that are perceived to be prestigious and influential because good 
scholarship may have an impact on the work of such institutions and because that is 
where, even for scholarship that does not seek to have such an impact, the prestige 
and influence oflegal scholars are thought to lie. In part for the same reasons, such 
institutions attract empirical study and thus generate the data that contemporary 
political scientists require for their work. 
If this is correct it helps to explain why those who write, and/or participate in 
policy debates, about judicial independence tend to refer to it as if it were a ~onolith, 
a concept having the same meaning everywhere and at all times. That tendency is in 
any event unsurprising to the extent that the individual in question treats judicial 
independence as an end in itself. Moreover, such a unitary goal would naturally take 
its shape from that which those harboring it know best, to wit, federal judicial 
independence (and the independence enjoyed by the Supreme Court in particular). 36 
32 See Robert Stevens, Judicial Independence in England: A Loss of Innocence, in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN 1HE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note l 0, at 155-72. 
33 See Scheppele, supra note 26. 
34 Burbank, supra note 2, at 342 (footnote omitted). 
35 See supra text accompanying note 7. 
36 Yet, as the legal realists taught us, even though the tendency to assume that the same word 
means the same thing in different contexts "has all the tenacity of original sin," it ''must constantly 
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Of course, few scholars labor Wlder this fallacy in fact, well recognizing the 
possibility that, even if they do not pause to inquire why, the quantum and quality of 
judicial independence (and accoWltability) may vary dramatically among courts in the 
United States. One reason they may not pause to inquire, however, has to do with a 
normative connnitment to judicial independence on the federal modei.37 Such a 
normative connnitment constitutes both a further disincentive to study state court 
systems (were it needed!) and an impediment to an instrumental Wlderstanding of 
judicial independence. 38 
Even if one is predisposed for normative reasons to the federal model, an 
instrumental view of judicial independence (and accoWltability) requires attention to 
what it is that we seek from courts and to possible differences in that regard among 
the various court systems in the United States and among courts within the same 
system. Although the inquiry must attend to both formal (including constitutional) 
and informal constraints on changing the arrangements we make for courts and 
judges that bear on their independence and accoWltability, it simply will not do to 
read into constitutions protections that are not there or to pretend that informal norms 
will last forever. Here as elsewhere in the American legal landscape, comparative 
scholarship is most valuable for the light it sheds on domestic institutions, and here as 
elsewhere in scholarship that attends to functional relationships, it is useless to 
proceed as if nothing had changed since 1787. 
On this view, rather than, for example, simply dismissing as defective state court 
systems where judges are not appointed and do not enjoy life tenure, and before 
seeking to bring about change in such systems, we need to try to make precise what it 
is we seek from courts, the degree of decisional independence (and accoWltability) 
that is necessary or desirable in order to achieve that end, and the arrangements, 
formal and informal, that are best calculated to yield that quantum of independence 
(and accoWltability). Although unable to elaborate this research agenda in great detail 
here, I set forth below some possible distinctions that may be helpful, if only in 
burying more deeply all three of the fallacies with which I am concerned in this 
article: that judicial independence is an end in itself. that it is in opposition to judicial 
accoWltability, and that it is a monolith. 
be guarded against." WALlER WHEELER CooK, THE loGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OFlHECoNFUCr 
OFLAWS 159(1942). 
3? This commitment itself may be a product of the academic utility function and. depending 
upon the historical period. may also reflect ideological allegiance to the products of federal 
litigation. 
38 There is irony in this neglect of state institutions, particularly in the legal scholarship on 
judicial independence. For, as the work of Jack Rakove has made clear, Madison was very 
attentive to those institutions and sought to prevent the excesses he perceived there in the 
arrangements he helped to fashion for the new federal government, including federal courts. See 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: PoUTICSANDIDEASIN1HEMAKINGOF1HECoNS1TIUTION 
290(1996). 
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A. Federal vs. State Courts 
From an instrumental perspective, the assertion or assumption that the only 
suitable arrangements affecting judicial independence (and accountability) for courts 
in the United States are those that have been and are made for federal courts implies 
not only that the latter are appropriate given the roles and functions of federal courts 
but that there are for these purposes no relevant differences between federal and state 
courts (or federal and state judges). Putting to one side evaluation of the federal 
arrangements, the hypothesis, in other words, is that there is nothing different about 
the roles and functions of state and federal courts, or the influences affecting their 
judges, that should cause those responsible for the rules that determine decisional 
independence (and accountability) to make different choices. A thorough evaluation 
of this hypothesis would be an enormous undertaking, requiring a detailed 
investigation of the various state court systems, the business they conduct, and their 
place in the larger political landscapes in which they are situated The present 
occasion permits only the suggestion of some general considerations that may be 
useful in testing it. 
Having said that I was putting the appropriateness of federal arrangements to the 
side, my first consideration nevertheless brings that question back on the scene. I raise 
it, however, because the federal model is likely to provide the baseline for 
comparative analysis of judicial roles and functions. It is the question of the 
significance, if any, that should be accorded the fact that the makers of the 
Constitution provided only for a Supreme Court, leaving to Congress the decision 
whether to create lower federal courts and if so to define the scope of their subject 
matter jurisdiction. 39 Whatever the makers thought Congress was likely to do,40 the 
arrangements they made that formally determined the decisional independence (and 
accountability) of the federal judiciary would clearly and surely apply only to a high 
court, one moreover operating under a constitutional provision (the Supremacy 
Clause) that can (but need not) be read to contemplate judicial revi'ew.41 
Whatever the implications of the Supremacy Clause for judicial review, its chief 
bite lies in the hierarchy of authority it establishes between federal and state law and 
the obligation it imposes on all courts, federal and state, to respect that hierarchy. 
With the acceptance of judicial review, that obligation extends to striking down state 
and federal laws found to be inconsistent with the federal constitution. Thus, unlike 
39 See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ l. 
40 See Geyh, supra note 19, at 168-69. 
41 U.S. CoNST. art. VI,§ 1, cl. 2: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
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the situation in a number of modem democratic societies, where there is a separate 
constitutional court with a monopoly on constitutional decisions, the members of 
which are subject to selection and retention arrangements quite different from the 
members of other courts, 42 every court in the United States is a constitutional court. 
To permit the consideration of the federal business of state courts to drive the 
inquiry into their roles and functions would be, however, again to exalt (in this case, 
without having separately evaluated) the federal model of arrangements bearing on 
decisional independence (and accountability). Moreover, and apart from the 
availability of Supreme Court review of the decisions of state courts on federal 
questions, the federal legislature and executive lack obvious means to control the 
decisions of state courts, to that extent negating the prirruuy historic functional 
justification for the federal arrangements.43 Of course, it may be that within a given 
state effective performance of the role of state constitutional judicial review might be 
thought to require functionally equivalent decisional independence. The question 
would then be whether the federal arrangements are the only or the best means to 
bring it about. 44 
Finally in this aspect, particularly if testing the hypothesis proceeds, explicitly or 
implicitly, by comparison of state with federal judicial roles and functions, it may be 
important to pay close attention to the respective lawmaking powers of those courts. 
The common lawmaking power of the courts of most states has long been recognized 
as extensive (whether as a power to make law or simply to find it). At least since early 
in the Republic the federal courts have not been thought endowed with comparable 
power as to questions of federal law, and their ability to bring about functionally 
similar results in state law diversity cases has been seriously constrained since 193 8. 45 
Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that structural differences between state and 
federal courts call for very different limitations on their authority.46 
B. Trial vs. Intermediate Appellate vs. Supreme (High) Courts 
We can never know whether, although it seems unlikely that, the makers of the 
Constitution would have fashioned different arrangements bearing on decisional 
independence (and accountability) for the lower federal courts than for the Supreme 
Court if they had established the former in that document mther than leaving 
decisions concerning them to Congress. If we knew the answer to that question was 
42 See Guarnieri, supra note I 0, at 112-15; Scheppele, supra note 26, at 247-68. 
43 See Burbank. supra note 2, at 331. 
44 See id. at 331-35; HURST, supra note 16, at 138--46. 
45 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common LaW: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 
I 005 ( 1985); Stephen B. Burbank. The Costs of Complexity, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1463, 1475 (I 987). 
46 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinldng the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1833 (2001); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State 
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 lfARv. L. REv. 1131 (1999). 
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negative, however, we still would not know much of significance for testing the 
hypothesis set forth above. For, as we have seen, the formal protections of decisional 
independence in the Constitution are dwarfed by those formal powers that could be 
used to control or influence decisions, and informal ammgements and understandings 
reached in their shadow may be far more significant to the quantum and quality of 
federal judicial independence (and accountability). 
Rather, I have raised the question as one means of encouraging attention to the 
notion that, because different courts within a given judicial system may play different 
roles, the arrangements we make for them that bear on their decisional independence 
(and accountability) may appropriately vary. Thus, for example, one might explore 
whether the same degree of insulation from political influence appropriate for a trial 
court, deciding questions of fact and applying law in a hierarchical system of 
precedent, is appropriate for an appellate court whose primary role is the creation of 
precedent binding both in the case before it and in other similar cases. 
The importance of judicial role is also a message carried by comparative 
scholarship exploring the etiology and functions of constitutional courts in emerging 
democracies.47 Indeed, it is a message that seems likely to emerge from empirical and 
historical study of the means by which the members of different American courts 
within the same system have been and are selected and/or retained (including their 
terms of office). 
As an example, data gathered throughout the country by the American Judicature 
Society indicate that in at least ten states different selection systems are used for 
members of trial and appellate courts.48 Careful study of those state systems may 
reveal that one reason for the differences was their architects' belief that different 
judicial functions warrant different degrees of judicial independence (and 
accountability). 49 
To take another example, when the question is federal judicial selection, there is a 
tendency to conceive of the role of the President and/or of the Senate in monolithic 
terms. Yet, as a number of studies clearly reveal, both have played very different roles 
in connection with nominations and confirmations to seats on the district courts, the 
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. so In a system where, from a political 
science perspective, accountability is front-end-loaded, the role differences of those 
responsible for selection thus have potentially significant implications for the 
47 See Scheppele, supra note 26. 
48 See Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 22. 
49 It is a separate question whether careful normative analysis would support current 
differences, particularly to the extent that they reflect the proposition that greater decisional 
independence Oess accountability) is appropriate for high courts than for mal courts. See infra text 
accompanying note 52. 
SO See, e.g., 8HEl.IX)N GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LoWER CoURTSELECIION fROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power: The 
Senate's Role in the Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24 (2002). 
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quantum and quality of decisional independence (and accountability), and they may 
be due at least in part to views about differences in the roles and functions of the 
courts to which appointments are to be made. 51 
In studying the possible implications of role difference within a court system for 
the arrangements that bear oo decisiorial independence (and accountability), it will be 
important to attend to both formal institutiooal structure and actual practice, to both 
the allocation of power that is supposed to exist and that which does exist. These 
inquiries will require attention to the theory and practice of precedent and of appellate 
review within the system. Moreover, in connection with trial courts, it will be 
important to consider the role of the jury. 
One hypothesis such work might explore is that both aslrongtradition ofbinding 
authority and a hierarchical structure providing more than one opportunity for review 
can act as powerful checks on decisional independence, and to that extent reduce the 
need for other fonns of decisional accountability. 52 That hypothesis would not pass 
unchallenged by political scientists, many of whom reject, if only because they cannot 
measure, the constraining force oflaw. 53 Perhaps, however, the reminder that political 
science has told us very little about the independence and accountability of courts 
other than the Supreme Court, coupled with attention to the point that even on that 
court ')udges often agree with one another, no doubt because the law is clear and they 
follow it,"54 will help to soften positions. Progress of that sort would be facilitated if 
legal scholars reciprocated by reading the political science literature and paid attention 
to the part that politics plays in judicial decisionmaking. · 
This discussion has suggested a number of considerations that seem to me 
important in pursing the possible relevance of different judicial roles for the 
arrangements that determine the quantum and quality of judicial independence (and 
accountability). The first is the importance of attending to changes in the roles and 
functions of a court over time. The second consideration, related to the first, is the 
importance of not permitting theory or fonnal structure to obscure actual practice. The 
third consideration, related to the second, is the importance of not permitting the 
extraordinary to obscure the ordinary. 
S 1 A similar perspective may help to understand the recent phenomenon of "treat[ing] all 
federal judicial appointments as if they were appointments to the Supreme Court." Editorial, 
Clinton s Legacy or Bork s?, 84 JUDICA TIJRE 224 (2001 ). 
52 Professor Scheppe1e has likened a typical court structure to an inverse pyramid, pointing 
out how increasing the size of the court as one goes up the system could moderate the effect of 
individual partisanship and/or ideology. Kim Lane Scheppele, Remarks at the AJS/Brennan Center 
Conference, see supra note • (March 31, 200 I) (transcript on file with the author). 
53 For recent progress in that regard, see, for example, Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. 
Krit::zer:,Jurisprudentia/ Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. PoL SCI. REV. 
305 (2002). 
54 Terri Jennings Peretti, Does Judicial Independence Exist? The Lessons of Social Science 
Research, in JUDJCIALINDEPENDENCEATTiiECROSSROADS,supra note 1, at 111. 
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I have speculated that the makers of the Constitution may have regarded law as a 
consequential constraint on decisional independence and that such an attitude may 
have affected the choices they made concerning the formal arrangements bearing on 
such independence (and accountability) in the Constitution.55 I have also noted, 
however, that attitudes towards law and lawmaking, particularly by judges, have 
changed since 1787, developments that could affect one's views about the 
appropriateness of those arrangements today. Moreover, wherever one looks in the 
federal judicial hierarchy, there have been substantial changes in the work and role, 
including the power, of the courts over time. 56 
Of course, just as it is important not to permit, for instance, the theory or tradition 
of appellate review (i.e., published opinion after full briefing and oral argument) to 
obscure the reality (i.e., judgment order after page-limited briefing and no oral 
argument), so is it important not to forget that, at least in tenns of numbers, ordinary 
cases surely dwarf extraordinary cases, with judges usually agreeing about that which 
they are pleased to call ''the law." Perhaps most important, as we have seen, the 
formal arrangements in the Constitution that could be used to constrain decisional 
independence dwarf the formal protections and both may pale in significance to 
informal norms and understandings reached in their shadow. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It may be that, at the end of the day, there is a core to the notion of judicial 
independence, an irreducible normative essence that must be present in any political 
system for a court to operate as such. The very statement of the proposition gives 
pause, however, and a review of the fallacies described here well suggests the 
problems with, and the limitations of, any effort to identifY such a core. 
Foremost is the fact that judicial independence is not an end in itselfbut a means 
to an end, which requires that the inquiry focus on the goal(s) to be achieved in 
determining the quantum and quality of independence (and accountability). It remains 
for different polities to define what it is that they want from their courts and the 
measure (or quality) of judicial independence they believe is necessary or appropriate 
in order to secure it. Is there a goal that any enlightened architect of any judicial 
55 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
56&eDoNAIDRSoNGERETAL.,CONTINUITYANDCJ.iANGEON1HEUNI1EDSTA1ESCOURTS 
OF APPEALS (2000); Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, 
Imagination and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 CoWM. L. REv. 1971, 1981-82 
( 1997); Edward A. Hannett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Year.l' After 
the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643 (2000). Thus, the federal judicial hierarchy may 
resemble an inverted pyramid, see supra note 52, but as proportionally fewer and fewer cases 
proceed up the pyramid and are fully considered by a superior court, the potential for the system 
effectively to constrain the decisional independence of inferior courts declines. 
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system would want courts in that system to be able to achieve and for which a 
measure of decisional independence would be necessary? 
The fact that judicial independence is not a monolith requires that the search for a 
core, and the consideration of social and political goals, comprehend (and consider 
differences among) at least all courts within a given system, while the fact that 
achieving a balance between independence and accountability is a pervasive 
challenge of institutional architecture requires that attention to history and formal 
arrangements be tempered by a realistic appraisal of the practical needs of modem 
government. A modem polity's goals for its judiciary will almost surely include 
functions that require a measure of accountability, just as they do a measure of 
independence. 
All of this suggests what comparative scholarship on judicial independence 
confirms, namely, the daunting obstacles that any attempt to develop a useful general 
theory of judicial independence confronts. The obstacles may appear less formidable, 
and the enterprise more tractable, to the extent that one assimilates other lessons of 
such scholarship. One such lesson, confirming an insight from comparative 
institutional scholarship, is that it is a mistake to take the measure of a court's judicial 
independence (or accountability) exclusively from formal arrangements. 57 Another, 
confirming the clear implication of an instrumental perspective, is that there are likely 
to be more ways than one to bring about the same measure of independence (and 
accountability). 
What do we mean by ·~udicial independence"? It depends. 
57 See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 U. 
CHI. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (!n)dependence of Courts: A 
Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEG. STIID. 721 ( 1994). 
